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Abstract
This paper analyzes the growth and welfare eﬀects of competition in an
endogenously-growing economy with imitation and non-diversiﬁable
risk. The main ﬁndings are as follows. There is no imitation without
positive proﬁts during innovation races. A larger proportion of com-
peting industries leads to slower economic growth. When competitive
proﬁts are high or low, the economy grows faster than when they are
of medium size. If the government subsidizes innovation and imita-
tion optimally, then competitive proﬁts are positively associated with
welfare. With an optimal uniform subsidy to all R&D, there is an
“inverted-U” relationship between competitive proﬁts and welfare.
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This paper considers the growth and welfare eﬀects of competition when
households cannot wholly diversify their investment risk and economic growth
is characterized by product cycles as follows. Through the development of
new products, an innovator achieves a temporary advantage earning monopoly
proﬁts. This advantage ends when an imitator succeeds in copying the inno-
vation, enters the market and starts competing with the innovator.
Product cycle models start from Segerstrom (1991), who assumes that
(i) incumbents and outsiders have the same costs of innovation, and (ii)
households eliminate investment risk wholly by diversiﬁcation. Assumption
(i) leads to leapfrogging: innovations will always be performed by outsiders
and the current industry leaders will be wholly replaced. To eliminate this
unrealistic outcome, Aghion et al. (1997, 2001) construct models where tech-
nological laggards must ﬁrst catch up with the leading-edge technology be-
fore battling “neck-to-neck” for technological leadership in the future. They
represent competition by the elasticity of substitution between ﬁrms’ prod-
ucts and show that competition has in general a positive eﬀect on economic
growth. Mukoyama (2003) constructs a model in which only leaders can con-
duct next-round innovation, while outsiders can become leaders by imitation.
He represents competition by the relative proportion of competing industries
and shows that competition very commonly promotes economic growth.
The three papers above are based on the assumption (ii) of full diver-
siﬁcation. W¨ alde (1999a, 1999b) shows that with non-diversiﬁable risk in-
vestment decisions are made by households rather than ﬁrms, and the equi-
librium conditions diﬀer substantially. To examine competition policy with
non-diversiﬁable risk, I extend W¨ alde’s one-industry growth model for an
economy with many industries and incorporate Mukoyama’s (2003) assump-
tions on imitation and cumulative technology into it. The model of this study
is therefore characterized as follows:
(i) Labor is homogeneous and inelastically supplied. It is used in innovation,
imitation or the production of the intermediate goods.
(ii) Competitive ﬁrms produce the consumption good from a great number
of intermediate goods according to Cobb-Douglas technology.
1(iii) Firms’ products are imperfect substitutes. A successful innovator of
a new technology crowds out all products made with old technology
and becomes a monopolistic producer until its technology is imitated.
A successful imitator starts producing a substitute for the innovator’s
product and establishes an innovation race with the incumbent produc-
ers. Imitation is necessary for an outsider to become an innovator.
(iv) R&D ﬁrms ﬁnance their expenditure by issuing shares. The households
save only in these shares. Each R&D ﬁrm distributes its proﬁt among
those who had ﬁnanced it in proportion to their investment in the ﬁrm.
The subsidies to R&D are ﬁnanced by lump-sum taxes.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Sections 2 and 3
consider ﬁrms in production and R&D. Section 4 examines households de-
ciding on saving. Section 5 examines general equilibrium and the eﬀects of
competition without government subsidies. Section 6 considers the eﬀects of
competition with government intervention.
2 Production
I assume a great number of intermediate-good industries that are placed
over the limit [0,1]. Industry j ∈ [0,1] contains intermediate-good ﬁrms
κ = 1,...,aj. The representative consumption-good ﬁrm makes its output y
















ε > 1, (1)
where Bj is the productivity parameter in industry j, aj the number of ﬁrms
in industry j, xj the quantity of intermediate good j, xjκ the output of ﬁrm
κ in industry j, and ε the elasticity of substitution between the products in
the same industry.1 The consumption-good ﬁrm maximizes its proﬁt
Π






1With the speciﬁcation (1), the price pj for the composite product of industry j will (in
the symmetric equilibrium pjκ = pj1) be independent of the number of producers in that
industry, aj. Otherwise, the eﬀect of aj on pj would excessively complicate the analysis.
2by its inputs xj, taking the output price P and the input prices {pjκ} as
ﬁxed. I normalize total consumption expenditure Py at unity. Because the
consumption-good ﬁrm is subject to constant returns to scale, we then obtain
Py = 1, Π




























jκ for all j and κ, (2)
where pj is the price of the composite product xj.
I assume that all intermediate-good ﬁrms produce one unit of their out-
put from one labor unit. Technological change is random. I assume that a
successful innovator in industry j makes a perfect substitute for intermediate
good j that is composed of the outputs all incumbent ﬁrms with older tech-
nology in industry j.2 The innovator’s proﬁt is Πj1 = (pj1−w)xj1, where pj1
is its output price, xj1 its output (= labor input) and w is the wage.
The innovator’s product provides exactly the constant µ > 1 times as
many services as the intermediate good of earlier generation. Firm κ of




jκ is its output
price and xo
jκ its output. The innovator pushes the old ﬁrms out of the market
by choosing its price pj1 so that these earn no proﬁt, Πo
jκ = 0 and po
jκ = w.
This and (2) yield pj1/µ = po
j = po
jκ = w, the mark-up rule pj1 = µw and the
innovator’s output and proﬁt as follows:
xj = xj1 = 1/pj1 = 1/(µw) and
Πj1 = (pj1 − w)xj1 = (1 − 1/µ)pj1xj1 = 1 − 1/µ . = Π for aj = 1. (3)
The innovator is the ﬁrst leader (i.e. the ﬁrst incumbent producer) in
industry j. A successful imitator of the state-of-art good is able to make a
close substitute for the product of the innovator. Thus with each imitation,
the number of leaders and products increases by one. I assume that all leaders
1,...,aj in industry j behave in Bertrand manner, taking each other’s prices
as given. Given (1) and (2), leader κ in industry j maximizes its proﬁt
πjκ = pjκxjκ − wxjκ = (pjκ − w)xjκ, (4)
2This assumption is in line with technology (1), because xj = xj1 for aj = 1.
3by its price pxjκ, assuming that the prices pjı for the other leaders ı 6= κ
in industry j are kept constant. It therefore sets the wage w equal to the
marginal product of labor. Noting (2), this leads to the ﬁrst-order condition
∂πjκ
∂pjκ








































Because the conditions (2) and (5) hold for all κ = 1,...,aj, the symmetry
pjκ = pj holds throughout all κ. This, (1), (2), (4) and (5) yield
pjκ/w =

1 − [ε + (1 − ε)/aj]
−1	−1 . = Φ(aj), Φ
0 < 0, ajpjκxjκ = 1,









xj = ajxjκ = 1/pjκ = 1/[Φ(aj)w]. (6)
In order to make product market competition eﬀective, I assume that the
entry of the second leader decreases the ﬁrst leader’s mark-up:
µ > Φ(2). (7)
If anyone invests in imitative R&D to enter an industry with one leader,
then his prospective proﬁt is πjκ


aj=2, but if he invests (with the same cost)
in imitative R&D to enter an industry with more than two leaders, then his
prospective proﬁt is πjκ
 
aj>2. Because, by (6), the proﬁt is smaller with more




aj>2, investors invest in imitative R&D only
to enter in one-leader industries. I summarize:
Proposition 1 Each industry has one or two leaders. In one-leader indus-
tries the followers imitate and in two-leader industries the leaders innovate.
I denote the set of one-leader industries by Θ ⊂ [0,1], and the relative




dj, β . =
Z
j/ ∈Θ
dj = 1 − α. (8)
4Noting aj = 2, (3), (6), (7) and (8), a ﬁrm’s proﬁt π (Π) and and total output
























The higher the elasticity of substitution between the products, ε, the closer
Φ(2) to its lower limit 1 and the smaller π.3 There are now two measures
of competition: a competing ﬁrm’s proﬁt π and the relative proportion of
the competing (two-leader) industries, β. The purpose of this paper is to
examine the growth and welfare eﬀects of these.
Noting (1), (3), (8) and (9), and summing up throughout all ﬁrms and
industries, we obtain that the employment of labor in production, x, and
total output y are determined as follows:
x . = αxα + (1 − α)xβ =
ϕ
w
, ϕ(α,π) . = (1 − Π)α + (1 − α)(1 − 2π) < 1 − 2π,
∂ϕ
∂α
= 2π − Π < 0,
∂ϕ
∂π


































β = χ(α,π)xB, χ(α,π) . = (1 − Π)
α(1 − 2π)
1−α/ϕ(α,π),




where x is employment, ϕ = wx wage expenditure and B the average level of
productivity in the production of intermediate goods j ∈ [0,1]. A decrease
in a competing ﬁrm’s proﬁt π increases employment x and total wages in
production, ∂ϕ/∂π < 0. Because competing industries j / ∈ Θ employ more
than monopoly industries j ∈ Θ (i.e. xβ > xα), a smaller proportion α of
monopoly industries raises employment x and total wages ϕ in production.




























and the following result:
3In papers that consider imitation in a framework with no growth, it is common to
measure competition directly by the level of proﬁt [Cf. Kanniainen and Stenbacka (2000)].
5Proposition 2 A higher competitive proﬁt π is associated with a higher pro-
ductivity χ of labor in production, ∂χ/∂π > 0.
Total output y = Bxα
αx
1−α
β must be maximized subject to the allocation of
labor between one-leader and two-leader industries, x = αxα + (1 − α)xβ,
keeping total employment in production, x, constant. Output y is at the
maximum, if all industries employ the same amount of labor, xα = xβ, and
this holds true only if the two-leader industries collude and set monopoly
prices, π = Π/2. A lower proﬁt in the two-leader industries transfers labor
into two-leader industries (i.e. xα falls and xβ rises by (10)). The greater the
diﬀerence xβ − xα, the lower y for given x.
3 Research
Given proposition 1, there are three types of R&D ﬁrms: the ﬁrst leader
(successful innovator), which I call ﬁrm 1, the second leader (successful im-
itator), which I call ﬁrm 2, and followers, which I call ﬁrm 0. In two-leader
industry j / ∈ Θ, ﬁrms 1 and 2 innovate and no ﬁrm imitates. The techno-
logical change of ﬁrm κ ∈ {1,2} is characterized by a Poisson process qjκ
in which the arrival rate of innovations, Λjκ, is in ﬁxed proportion λ to the
ﬁrm’s own labor input ljκ:
Λjκ = λljκ for j / ∈ Θ and κ ∈ {1,2}. (11)
During a short time interval dν, there is an innovation dqjκ = 1 in ﬁrm κ with
probability Λjκdν, and no innovation dqjκ = 0 with probability 1 − Λjκdν.
In one-leader industry j ∈ Θ, the representative follower (ﬁrm 0) imitates
and no ﬁrm innovates. The technological change of ﬁrm 0 is characterized





β for j ∈ Θ, (12)
where lj0 is the ﬁrm’s own labor input, `β the average labor input to innova-
tive R&D in the economy and γ > 0 and ς ∈ (0,1) are constants. The input
`β characterizes the immediate spillover of knowledge from innovative to im-
6itative R&D.4 During a short time interval dν, there is an imitation dQj = 1
with probability Γjdν, and no imitation dQj = 0 with probability 1 − Γjdν.
The invention of a new technology in industry j raises the number of
technology in that industry, tj, by one and the level of productivity, B
tj
j , by
µ > 1. Given this and (10), the average productivity in the economy, B, is a











j = µ, (13)
where {tk} denotes a vector that consists of tk for all k. The arrival rate of
innovations in industry j / ∈ Θ is the sum of the arrival rates of both ﬁrms in
the industry, Λj1 + Λj2. The average growth rate of Bj due to technological









= (Λj1 + Λj2)logµ,
where E is the expectation operator.5 Because only industries j / ∈ Θ inno-
vate, then, noting (11), the average growth rate of the average productivity



















(lj1 + lj2)dj. (14)








There exists a ﬁxed number N of households, each supplying one labor unit.
Total labor supply N is equal to inputs in production, x, and R&D, l:
N = x + l. (16)
4In the case ς = 0 investment in imitative R&D were subject to constant returns to scale
and there were no equilibrium for a household (see section 4 and Appendix A, especially
equations (53) and (54)). With the spillover eﬀect ς > 0, the average product of labor in
innovative R&D, Γj/lj0, falls with the increase in labor input lj0. This property ensures
that a household has an equilibrium.
5For this, see Aghion and Howitt (1998), p. 59.
7The government subsidizes R&D expenditures, but possibly at diﬀerent
rates in innovating and imitating industries. Given 9, we obtain total expen-
ditures from these subsidies as follows:






(wlj1 + wlj2)dj, (17)
where wlj0 is expenditure on imitation in ﬁrm 0 industry j ∈ Θ, wljκ expen-




is the subsidy to imitation (innovation). If the government
cannot discriminate between innovation and imitation, then τα = τβ.
In industry j ∈ Θ ﬁrm 0 and in industry j / ∈ Θ ﬁrms 1 and 2 issue shares
to ﬁnance their labor expenditure in R&D, net of government subsidies. Be-
cause the households invest in these shares, we obtain
N X
ι=1
Sιj0 = (1 − τα)wlj0 for j ∈ Θ,
N X
ι=1
Sιjκ = (1 − τβ)wljκ for κ ∈ {1,2} and j / ∈ Θ, (18)
where wlj0 is the imitative expenditure of ﬁrm 0 in industry j ∈ Θ, τα the
subsidy to it, wljκ the innovative expenditure of ﬁrm κ ∈ {1,2} in industry
j / ∈ Θ, τβ subsidy to it, Sιj0 (Sιjκ) household ι’s investment in ﬁrm 0 in






aggregate investment in ﬁrm 0 in industry j ∈ Θ (ﬁrm κ in industry j / ∈ Θ).









for j / ∈ Θ. (19)
I denote household ι’s income by Aι. Total income throughout all house-
holds ι ∈ {1,...,N} is then equal to income earned in the production of
consumption goods, Py, plus income earned in R&D, wl, minus government
expenditures R (= lump-sum taxes). Since Py = 1 by (2), this yields
N X
ι=1
Aι = Py + wl − R = 1 + wl − R. (20)
84 Households
The utility for risk-averting household ι ∈ {1,...,N} from an inﬁnite stream







−ρ(ν−T)dν with 0 < σ < 1 and ρ > 0, (21)
where ν is time, E the expectation operator, Cι the index of consumption, ρ
the rate of time preference and 1/(1−σ) is the constant relative risk aversion.
Because investment in shares in R&D ﬁrms is the only form of saving in
the model, the budget constraint of household ι is given by






(Sιj1 + Sιj2)dj, (22)
where Aι is the household’s total income, Cι its consumption, P the consump-
tion price, and Sιj0 (Sιjκ) the household’s investment in ﬁrm 0 in industry
j ∈ Θ (ﬁrm κ in industry j / ∈ Θ). When household ι has ﬁnanced a success-
ful R&D ﬁrm, it acquires the right to the ﬁrm’s proﬁt in proportion to its
relative investment share. Thus, I deﬁne:
sιjκ household ι’s true proﬁt from ﬁrm κ in industry j when the uncertainty
in R&D is taken into account;
iιjκ household ι’s investment share in ﬁrm κ in industry j [Cf. (19)];
Πiιjκ household ι’s expected proﬁt from ﬁrm κ ∈ {1,2} in industry j / ∈ Θ
after innovation in ﬁrm κ have changed the two-leader industry j into
a one-leader industry;
πiιj0 household ι’s expected proﬁt from ﬁrm 0 in industry j ∈ Θ after imita-
tion in ﬁrm 0 have changed the one-leader industry j into a two-leader
industry.
The changes in the proﬁts of ﬁrms in industry j are functions of the
increments (dqj1,dqj2,dQj) of Poisson processes (qj1,qj2,Qj) as follows:6
dsιjκ = (Πiιjκ − sιjκ)dqjκ − sιjκdqj(ζ6=κ) when j / ∈ Θ;
dsιj0 = (πiιj0 − sιj0)dQj when j ∈ Θ. (23)
6This extends the idea of W¨ alde (1999a, 1999b).
9These functions can be explained as follows. If a household invests in leader
κ in industry j / ∈ Θ, then, in the advent of a success for that leader, dqjκ = 1,
the amount of its share holdings rises up to Πiιjκ, dsιjκ = Πiιjκ −sιjκ, but in
the advent of success for the other leader ζ 6= κ, its share holdings in leader
κ fall down to zero, dsιjκ = −sιjκ. If a household invests in imitating ﬁrm 0
in industry j ∈ Θ, then, in the advent of a success for the ﬁrm, dQj = 1, the
amount of its share holdings rises up to πiιj0, dsιj0 = πiιj0 − sιj0.
Household ι’s total income Aι consists of its wage income w (the household
supplies one labor unit), its proﬁts sιj1 from the single leader in each industry
j ∈ Θ, its proﬁts sιj1 and sιj2 from the two leaders 1 and 2 in each industry
j / ∈ Θ, minus its share 1/N in the government’s expenditures R (= the
household’s lump-sum tax). Given this and (9), we obtain










Household ι maximizes its utility (21) by its investment, {Sιj0} for j ∈ Θ
and {Sιj1,Sιj2} for j / ∈ Θ, subject to its budget constraint (22), the stochas-
tic changes (23) in its proﬁts, the composition of its income, (24), and the
determination of its relative investment shares, (19), given the arrival rates
{Λjκ,Γj}, the wage w, the consumption price P, the subsidies (τα,τβ) and
the government’s expenditures R. In the households’ stationary equilibrium
in which the allocation of resources is invariable across technologies, this
maximization yields the following results (see Appendix A):
ljκ = `β for j / ∈ Θ,
lj0 = `α for j ∈ Θ,
`α
`β

















< 0, ψ(π,τ,τ) = ψ(π,1,1), (25)







τααψ + 2τβ(1 − α)
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Result (25) says that with a smaller subsidy τα to imitative R&D, a bigger
subsidy τβ to innovative R&D or with a lower proﬁt π, investors spend rel-
atively more in innovative than imitative R&D (i.e. a higher `β/l). With a
10uniform R&D subsidy τα = τβ = τ, the relative investment in imitation is
independent of the subsidy.
The equations (25) lead to the following result:
Proposition 3 If there are no competitive proﬁts, π = 0, then there is no
imitation, lj0 = `α = 0 for j ∈ Θ.
With non-diversiﬁable risk, households hold the shares of all innovating ﬁrms
in their portfolios. Given this, they have no incentives to invest in imitating
R&D unless there are proﬁts during the innovation race.
5 General equilibrium
When innovation occurs in an industry, this industry switches from the group
of two-leader industries to that of one-leader industries, and when imita-
tion occurs in an industry, this industry switches from one-leader industries
to two-leader industries. In a steady-state equilibrium, every time a new
superior-quality product is discovered in some industry, imitation must oc-
cur in some other industry.7 Thus, the rate at which industries leave the
group of two-leader industries, β(Λj1 + Λj2)dν, is equal to the rate at which
industries leave the group of one-leader industries, αΓjdν. This, (8), (11),





























Given this equation, one solves for the proportion of one-leader industries as:
α(π,τα,τβ) = Ψ(ψ) . =
2λ








∂α/∂π < 0, ∂α/∂τα < 0, ∂α/∂τβ > 0, α(π,τ,τ) = α(π,1,1). (29)
7Cf. Segerstrom (1991), p. 817.
11Finally, given (10), (25) and (29), one obtains that wage expenditure in













= (2π − Π)Ψ
0∂ψ
∂π
+ 2(α − 1)
= (1 − α)

















































= α − 1 < 0, (30)
where the constant π0 ∈ (1,µ) is deﬁned by the equation
(1/ς − 1)(Π/π0 − 2)α(π0,τα,τβ) = 1.
Inserting (29) into equations (28) and noting (8), (10), (25), (26), (27)

























g = ∇(l,τα,τβ,π) . = ∆(l,α,τα,τβ,π) . =





τααψ + 2τβ(1 − α)
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The equation (31) says that the demand for labor devoted to R&D, l,
is in ﬁxed proportion to the growth rate g, and the equation (32) that a
household’s subjective discount factor ρ+
1−µσ
log µg is equal to the rate of return
to savings, ∇. These two equations form a system of two unknown variables l
and g. The equilibrium is in the intersection Q of these. By the comparative
12statics of this system, one obtains















































Unfortunately, these results are ambiguous, because an increase in the growth
rate g lowers both a household’s subjective discount factor ρ+
1−µσ
log µg and the
rate of return to savings, ∇, through lower employment l in R&D. Empiri-
cally, one can assume that a small targeted subsidy τβ to innovative R&D
is growth enhancing. In such a case, the eﬀect through the rate of return to
savings outweighs that through the subjective discount factor. The results
(33) can then be rephrased as follows:
Proposition 4 A higher proportion β of competing industries in the econ-
omy decreases the growth rate. A uniform subsidy τ to all R&D is growth
enhancing. When the competitive proﬁt π is initially lower (higher) than the
constant π0, an increase in it is growth-hampering (growth-enhancing).
A higher proportion of competing industries raises the demand for labor in
production. This decreases labor devoted to R&D and the growth rate. A
higher subsidy to all R&D increases investment in R&D and the growth
rate. A decrease in the proﬁt is in general growth enhancing because of cost
escaping eﬀect, except that at high initial proﬁt margins (i.e. π > π0) it is
outweighed by the “wage eﬀect” as follows. With lower proﬁts, ﬁrms charge
lower prices, produce more and employ more labor in production.
6 Optimal public policy
The symmetry across the households ι = 1,...,n yields Cι = y/N. Noting
Cι = y/N, (10), (16), (29) and (31), a single household’s consumption relative





































where Ψ−1 is the inverse function of Ψ. Given this, a single household’s









On the assumption that the government is benevolent, it maximizes the
representative household’s welfare (35). I consider two cases:
(a) First-best policy. The government can discriminate between innovation
and imitation, τα 6= τβ. Because there is one-to-one correspondence
from (τα,τβ) to (g,α) through (25), (29) and (33), the government can
control the growth rate g and the proportion of imitating industries,
α, by the subsidies (τα,τβ). It maximizes social welfare (35) by the
growth rate g and the proportion of imitating industries, α.
(b) Second-best policy. The government cannot discriminate between inno-
vation and imitation, τα = τβ = τ. Given (25), (29) and (33), the pro-
portion of imitating industries, α, is wholly exogenous and the growth
rate g can be controlled by the uniform subsidy τ. The government
then maximizes social welfare (35) by g.
I denote by Υ({tk}) the value of each industry k using current technology




the value of industry j using technology tj + 1,
when other industries k 6= j use current technology tk. The maximization




maxg,α F in the case of ﬁrst-best policy (a),
maxg F in the case of second-best policy (b),
where



































14(a) First-best policy. The socially optimal levels for the growth rate g and

















is the elasticity of consumption with respect to the proportion of imitating
industries. Inserting g = g∗ from (37) into (28) yields the following result:
Proposition 5 The welfare-maximizing subsidy to innovative R&D is
τ
∗













If the government cannot discriminate between innovative and imitative R&D,
then this is also the welfare-maximizing uniform subsidy to all R&D.
In explaining proposition 5, the starting point is that τ∗
α determines the
welfare-maximizing levels for both subsidies (τα,τβ). The next proposition
considers how much τα and τβ should be diﬀerentiated. The lower the propen-
sity to consume, h, the average rate of return to investment in imitative
R&D, z, or the relative proportion of workers in R&D, l/x, the more R&D
should be subsidized. The promotion of R&D by subsidies speeds up growth
and increases future consumption and welfare. On the other hand, it crowds
out the production of consumption goods through higher wages and decreases
welfare. The subsidies to R&D should be increased as long as the former
growth eﬀect dominates over the latter current-consumption eﬀect. The lower
the propensity to consume, h, the weaker the current-consumption eﬀect and
the higher the optimal subsidy. The lower the “private” rate of return z to
imitative R&D, the higher subsidy is needed to cover the gap between it and
the social rate of return to imitative R&D. Finally, the lower the relative
proportion of workers in R&D, l/x, the less a proportional increase in R&D
crowds out current consumption and the higher the optimal subsidy.
Inserting (37) into (25), we obtain [see Appendix C]:
15Proposition 6 If the government can discriminate between innovation and
imitation, τα 6= τβ, then the welfare-maximizing subsidy to imitative R&D,
τ∗




























The bigger the relative proﬁt in the two-leader industries, π/Π, or the less
workers there are in R&D (i.e. the smaller l/x), the more the government
should prefer innovation to imitation (i.e. the higher τ∗
β relative to τα and the
lower the ratio (1−τ∗
β)/(1−τα)). The proﬁt in the two-leader industries, π,
and the subsidy to imitative R&D, τα, are strategic substitutes, for they both
increase the incentives to imitate. Therefore, at the optimum, the increase
in π relative to Π should lead to the decrease in τα relative to τβ.
Noting (34), (36) and proposition 2, we obtain ∂χ/∂π > 0, ∂c/∂π > 0,
∂F/∂π > 0 and the following result:
Proposition 7 In the ﬁrst-best case τα 6= τβ, an increase in the competitive
proﬁt π is welfare-enhancing (i.e. F rises).
(b) Second-best policy. In this case, the rule (39) determines the uniform
subsidy τ = τα = τβ and the welfare-maximizing level α∗ of α is given by
(37). Because α is an decreasing function of π through ψ [cf. (25) and
(29)], there is a welfare-maximizing level π∗ for the mark-up factor π in the
two-leader industries as well. This result can be rephrased as follows:
Proposition 8 If the government cannot discriminate between innovation
and imitation but uses the uniform subsidy τ = τα = τβ optimally, then there
is an “inverted-U” relationship between the competitive proﬁt π and welfare.
A decrease in the proﬁt has two opposing eﬀects. It decreases the consump-
tion price and thereby increases current consumption and welfare. On the
other hand, it transfers labor from R&D to the production of goods. This
decreases the growth rate, future consumption and welfare. These opposing
eﬀects are balanced for π = π∗ and α = α∗.
167 Conclusions
This paper examines a multi-industry economy in which growth is generated
by creative destruction. In each industry, a ﬁrm creating the newest tech-
nology by a successful innovative R&D project crowds out the other ﬁrms
with older technologies from the market and becomes the ﬁrst leader of the
industry. A ﬁrm creating a copy of the newest technology starts producing
a close substitute for the innovator’s product and establishes an innovation
race with the ﬁrst leader. There is systematic investment risk that the house-
holds cannot eliminate by diversiﬁcation. The government subsidizes R&D,
possibly discriminating between innovative and imitative R&D, and aﬀects
the competing ﬁrms’ mark up rate through competition policy.
Mukoyama (2003) assumes that ﬁrms’ products are perfect substitutes
and shows that ﬁrms’ are ready to imitate in order to be able to participate
in the innovation race, although during the race there are no proﬁts. After
the assumption of fully diversiﬁable risk is relaxed, this is no more possible.
With non-diversiﬁable risk, households hold the shares of all innovating ﬁrms
in their portfolios. Given this, they have no incentives to invest in imitating
R&D unless there are proﬁts during the innovation race.
In the literature, the degree of product market competition has been
represented by either the elasticity of the substitution of ﬁrms’ products
[Cf. Aghion et al. (1997, 2001)] or the proportion of competing industries
in the economy [Cf. Mukoyama (2003)]. This paper shows that with non-
diversiﬁable risk these two representations are qualitatively diﬀerent. The
elasticity of product substitution is otherwise growth enhancing, except that
at high elasticities it is outweighed by the “wage eﬀect” as follows. With
more intense PMC ﬁrms charge lower prices, produce more and employ more
labor in production. The proportion of competing industries is negatively
associated with the growth rate.
The other ﬁndings of this paper are as follows. In the ﬁrst-best case
where the government is able to set diﬀerent subsidies to innovation and
imitation, a higher elasticity of product substitution diminishes welfare. It
transfers labor from the one-leader industries, which contain a recent inno-
vator and a number of imitating followers, into the two-leader industries, in
which an innovator and a recent imitator are in an innovation race. Because
17the decrease in output in the one-leader industries outweighs the increase in
output in the two-leader industries in terms of consumption, consumption
and welfare must fall.
In the second-best case where the government cannot discriminate be-
tween innovation and imitation but uses a uniform subsidy to all R&D, there
is an “inverted-U” relationship between the elasticity of product substitution
and social welfare. A higher elasticity has two opposing eﬀects. It decreases
the consumption price and thereby increases current consumption and wel-
fare. On the other hand, it transfers labor from R&D to the production of
goods and thereby decreases the growth rate, future consumption and wel-
fare. The elasticity of product substitution is at its welfare-maximizing level
when these two opposing eﬀects are balanced. When it is below (above) the








the value of receiving proﬁts sιkυ from all ﬁrms υ in all in-





the value of receiving the proﬁt Πiιjκ
from ﬁrm κ in industry j / ∈ Θ using technology tj +1, but receiving no
proﬁts from the other ﬁrm which was a leader in that industry when
technology tj was used, and receiving proﬁts sι(k6=j)υ from all ﬁrms υ in





the value of receiving proﬁts πiιjκ from ﬁrms
κ ∈ {1,2} in industry j ∈ Θ, but receiving proﬁts sι(k6=j)υ from all ﬁrms
υ in the other industries k 6= j with current technology tk.






Sιj ≥ 0 for all j
Ξι, (40)










































































for j ∈ Θ. (43)
I try the solution that for each household ι the propensity to consume,
hι, and the subjective interest rate rι are independent of income Aι, i.e.
PCι = hιAι and Ω = Cσ
ι /rι. Let us denote variables depending on technology



















The share in the next innovator tj +1 is determined by investment under the




ιjκ for j / ∈ Θ. The share in the next imitator








































































































































































(1 − τβ)rιw{tk}P tj+1,{tk6=j}l
{tk}
jκ


























































(1 − τα)rιw{tk}P {tk}l
{tk}
j0
for j ∈ Θ. (48)
I focus on a stationary equilibrium where the growth rate g and the
allocation of labor, (ljκ,x), are invariant across technologies. Given (2),
(10), (13) and (16), this implies
l
{tk}
jκ = ljκ, x
{tk} = x = N − l, w






















Inserting (14), (41), (44), (45), (49) and g . =
R































































































































This equation is equivalent to




Because there is symmetry throughout all households ι, their propensity
to consume is equal, hι = h. This, (17), (18), (20), (22), (24) and (44) yield






(lj1 + lj2)dj − R
= (1 − τα)w
Z
j∈Θ


















= (1 − h)
N X
ι=1
Aι = (1 − h)(1 + wl − R).
Solving for the propensity to consume, we obtain
hι = h = (1 + wl − R)
−1. (51)
Given (10) and (16), we obtain the wage
w = ϕ/x = ϕ(α,π)/(N − l). (52)
21I deﬁne the rate of return to imitative R&D by z . = πΓj/(wlj0). Inserting


























































































σ−1 for j ∈ Θ.
(54)
Given equations (53) and (54) and (9), we obtain
ljκ = `β for j / ∈ Θ,
lj0 = `α for j ∈ Θ,
`α
`β






∂ψ/∂π > 0, ∂ψ/∂τα > 0, ∂ψ/∂τβ < 0, [∂ψ/∂τ]τα=τβ=τ = 0. (55)














= α`α + 2(1 − α)`β = [αψ + 2(1 − α)]`β,
`β = [αψ + 2(1 − α)]















dj = ταw`αα + 2τβw`β(1 − α)
=

τααψ + 2τβ(1 − α)
















τααψ + 2τβ(1 − α)

[αψ + 2(1 − α)]−1	
wl
, (56)
Λjκ = λ`β = λ[αψ + 2(1 − α)]




(Λj1 + Λj2)dj = (2logµ)(1 − α)Λjκ
=
(2λlogµ)(1 − α)l
αψ + 2(1 − α)
=
(2λlogµ)l












Equations (52), (55), (56), (57) and (58) deﬁne (25)-(28).
B. Results (37)
Noting (34), the ﬁrst-order conditions for g and α in the government’s























































where ϑ is independent of the endogenous variables of the system. Noting












































[1/ϑ − ρ + (µ
σ − 1)g/(logµ)]
and
1/ϑ = ρ − (µ
σ − 1)g/(logµ) < ρ. (63)




















































































































Noting (64), we obtain
g =
ρσ logµ
(µσ − 1)(σ + x/l)
.
Given (38) and (65), ∂c/∂α < 0, η > 0 and α . = η/(η + l/x) hold.
C. Proposition 6
Inserting α = α∗ and (37) into (29) and noting yields
γ/2
(λ + γ)ψ + ξ



























Solving for the ratio (1 − τ∗































Aghion, P., Harris, C. and Vickers, J. (1997). Competition and growth
with step-by-step innovation: an example. European Economic Review 41,
771-782.
Aghion, P., Harris, C., Howitt, P. and Vickers, J. (2001). Competition,
Imitation and growth with step-by-step innovation. Review of Economic
Studies 68, 467-492.
24Aghion, P. and Howitt, P. (1998). Endogenous Growth Theory. Cambridge
(Mass.): MIT Press.
Barro, R.J. and Sala-i-Martin, X. (1995). Economic Growth. New York:
MacGraw-Hill.
Cheng, L.K. and Tao, Z. (1999). The impact of public policies on innovation
and imitation: the role of R&D technology in growth models. International
Economic Review 40, 187-207.
Dixit, A. and Pindyck, K. (1994). Investment under Uncertainty. Princeton:
Princeton University Press.
Kanniainen, V. and Stenbacka, R. (2000). Endogenous imitation and impli-
cations for technology policy. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Eco-
nomics 156, 360-381.
Mukoyama, T. (2003). Innovation, imitation, and growth with cumulative
technology. Journal of Monetary Economics 50, 361-380.
Segerstrom, P.S. (1998). Innovation, imitation, and economic growth. Jour-
nal of Political Economy 99, 807-827.
Segerstrom, P.S. (1991). Endogenous growth without scale eﬀects. The
American Economic Review 88, 1290-1310.
W¨ alde, K. (1999a). A model of creative destruction with undiversiﬁable risk
and optimizing households. The Economic Journal 109, C156-C171.
W¨ alde, K., (1999b). Optimal saving under Poisson uncertainty. Journal of
Economic Theory 87, 194–217.
25